Indigenous Community Recognition, Identity, and Democracy: Evidence from Peru

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January 2023

The collective recognition of indigenous claims to land and traditional authority have advanced rapidly in recent decades in many countries around the globe. How do these processes impact identity and views of democracy among individuals within communities themselves? I examine this in Peru, where the government has recognized thousands of indigenous communities covering one-third of the national territory. I leverage spatial and temporal variation in community recognition paired with detailed household survey data and find, using age cohort analysis, that the effects vary by generation in ways shaped by land access and land scarcity. Recognition increases community self-identification, community membership, and positive views of democracy. But the effects are strongest among adults and near-adults at the time of recognition, who are best positioned to win greater access to scarce community land and invest in community life immediately post-recognition. Indigenous communities in Peru, like in many postcolonial states, struggle with multigenerational reconstitution following legacies of dispossession and marginalization that sapped them of their most important resource – land.

* I thank Mauricio Espinoza, Siobhan Finnerty, Victor Gamarra, and Jiehan Liu for excellent research assistance. Pedro Típula at the Instituto del Bien Común graciously shared expertise and data on community recognition.

Countries around the world define subnational indigenous identity groups and recognize collective claims to territory and self-governance. Nearly half of all countries now recognize forms of indigenous governance in their constitutions and many more do so through legal provisions (Cuskelly 2011, Holzinger et al. 2018). How does collective indigenous recognition impact identity and views of government among indigenous communities?

Scholars have long been concerned with the implications of this question. On the one hand, a large literature views strong subnational identity and categorical diversity as a challenge to nation-building and potentially undermining to democratic political practice (Tilly 1992, Fukuyama 2018). Others view advances in multiculturalism as enhancing democratic legitimacy and participation and supporting feelings of both non-dominant group self-identification and inclusion in an expanded view of the nation (Madrid 2012, Van Cott 2005).

Yet there are few direct studies of how collective indigenous recognition impacts identity and views of democracy in practice, and none that directly address dynamics and variation among individuals within communities themselves in ways that generalize.[1] Understanding these dynamics is important because there is wide unexplained variation within communities and even within families in patterns of self-identification and views of government (e.g., Postero 2007). State recognition of indigenous communities can affect cohorts differently in ways that are both persistent and that can strongly shape patterns of identity and views of government within society. For instance, there can be considerable differences among generations, even within the same communities, that cut against trends toward non-dominant group self-identification in

[1] Most of the important scholarship to date on the causes and effects of indigenous recognition focuses on cross-national comparisons (Behr 2018, Holzinger et al. 2018), cross-sections of individual-level opinions (Fierro 2020), community trends (McMurry 2022), or ethnography (see Jackson and Warren 2005). With some exceptions (e.g., McMurry 2022), this work tends to focus more on identity per se than the impact of policies of recognition.

younger generations. Identifying these differences and their origins can help shed light on the dividends and limitations of indigenous recognition.

This paper exploits the wide spatial and temporal variation in the state recognition of indigenous communities in Peru paired with rich individual-level survey data and argues that a crucial but overlooked factor – land access – is key in shaping intergenerational patterns of self-identification, views of democratic functioning, and confidence in government following state recognition. Peru is an important case for the recognition of indigenous communities given its large indigenous population. The 2017 census indicates that slightly over 25% of the population self-identifies as indigenous.[2] This places the country, along with Bolivia, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Mexico, as having one of the largest indigenous populations in the Americas and indeed the world. Peru's history of indigenous communities and community recognition over the last century also shares key parallels to similarly situated countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Mexico (Yashar 2005), making it a fair case for testing the impacts of collective recognition. And the policies it has adopted toward indigenous communities, including collective property rights to ancestral lands, the recognition of indigenous governing institutions, and legal status are similar to those elsewhere in the Americas, Australasia, and Asia.

As in indigenous communities across the Americas and in many other regions, land is central to identity in Peru's indigenous communities. These communities have ancestral links to land and their residents disproportionately reside in rural areas that reflect that relationship. But land has long been scarce in many of Peru's indigenous communities. Throughout the Americas, and in Peru, Spanish colonizers and post-independence economic elites appropriated indigenous

[2] Estimates of the share of indigenous population vary based on the proxy used. Many Peruvians who self-identify as white or mestizo retain elements of indigenous identity (e.g., by speaking an indigenous language) and have a degree of ethnic consciousness (de la Cadena 2000). Closer to 40% of the population was classified as indigenous as recently as the 1990s.

lands. After initial demographic collapse, indigenous populations later grew considerably. The result is that there is not enough land to go around in most communities and land tenure has long been insecure and informal.

Land scarcity has critical consequences that condition how state recognition of communities impacts self-identification and views of government within communities themselves. Official state recognition of a community makes its land more secure and therefore desirable and also increases potential for state benefits. This drives up demand for land among community members.

Using age cohort analysis, I find that adults at the time of recognition are more likely to self-identify as a member of an indigenous community over other identities than both those who are young when recognition occurs and those who are born into a recognized community. Adults and teenagers at the time of recognition are also more likely to become formally inscribed community members than those who are young and those who are born post-recognition. Adults are similarly more likely to report feeling that democracy works well, and they hold greater confidence in regional government, which is the key administrative level at which state recognition processes occur and community policies are formulated and executed in Peru.

I attribute these findings to the ability of adults and near-adults to claim access to land and community membership in the wake of state recognition. Accessing community land requires community membership, which in turn is only granted to participating individuals after reaching adulthood. I find that adults and near-adults at the time of recognition are more likely to hold land and work in agriculture, and these trends increase with age. These individuals are also more likely to participate in core community functions, like local citizen policing groups. In short, recognition encourages those who are well-situated to gain more land and invest in

community life, which shapes self-identification and local community participation over time.

The findings suggest promise in the state recognition of indigenous communities but also limitations. By exacerbating demographic pressure through dispossession, the colonial project continues to cast a shadow on the reconstitution of indigenous communities by limiting the multigenerational ability to reclaim heritage and livelihoods rooted in land access. Other policies of support and restitution may be necessary to facilitate a more comprehensive reconstitution of community identity and life.

INDIGENOUS RECOGNITION, IDENTITY, AND DEMOCRACY

Shifts in international law and domestic political conditions have generated widespread – though hardly complete – acceptance for indigenous peoples' collective rights of self-determination in recent decades. Indigenous rights advocates have helped to advance this agenda through accords like the watershed ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 1989 and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People adopted in 2007, which recognize universal rights to collective self-determination for indigenous peoples.[3] Many countries have adopted constitutions and laws to reflect this (Cuskelly 2011, Holzinger et al. 2018).

With this shift has come a resurgence of identification among indigenous groups as culturally and socially distinct from dominant national ethnic groups. For instance, at the demands of indigenous peoples and in the context of a leftward political shift, many countries in Latin America, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have adopted multicultural constitutions

[3] ILO Convention 169 defines indigenous peoples as "tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural, and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs and traditions or by special laws and regulations." This is broader than the definition of indigenous peoples as descendants of precolonial populations.

and citizenship regimes that recognize and protect ethnic and minority rights (Hooker 2005, Madrid 2012).[4] And many countries in the region such as Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and El Salvador recently began including census questions on ethnic identity (Loveman 2014). This trend is hardly limited to Latin America. Countries as diverse as Australia, the Philippines, and Norway have also elevated rights, protections, and autonomy for indigenous groups.

But policies of indigenous recognition predate developments in recent decades. Countries over the past century have adopted policies ranging from the creation of indigenous territorial reservations to land restitution to the recognition of existing indigenous claims over land and an ability to operate under traditional authorities within those communities. For instance, Yashar (2005) highlights how Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru began recognizing indigenous communities and rights to land and self-governance beginning in the early-mid 20th century. The same occurred even earlier in countries like the United States and Canada.

Of course, not all of these policies serve to practically strengthen the land claims or autonomy of indigenous communities. Some policies cordoned off indigenous groups to the margins of society as second-class citizens or even non-citizens. Others used recognition as a way for the state to pry into communities through rules and regulations that aimed at assimilation of populations into national social and economic practices. In much of Latin America, this came in the guise of class-based recognition of indigenous groups as peasants, which unwittingly gave communities the space to strengthen local autonomy and authority systems (Yashar 2005).

Scholars have grappled with the consequences and normative implications of recognizing indigenous communities as distinct groups with collective rights to manage resources and aspects of self-governance. Numerous scholars have emphasized how ethnic diversity and identity

[4] Chile has also been debating a new multicultural constitution in recent years.

politics more generally raises challenges to democratic functioning by generating inter-ethnic competition and distrust, eroding feelings of national solidarity and belonging, and corroding mutual toleration (e.g., Dahl 1998, Norris 2008, Fukuyama 2018). Recognizing collective rights and local autonomy in particular also raises concerns about empowering nonstate actors as political brokers (Acemoglu et al. 2014) and potentially complicating accountability mechanisms by introducing overlapping jurisdictions (Sieder 2002). It could also foster subnational authoritarian enclaves (Benton 2012), particularly where indigenous communities adhere to illiberal practices such as sexism and use autonomy to perpetuate them (Van Cott 2008, 226-230). And it could erode incentives for collective action that are important for indigenous communities to advance their political representation and demands (Carter 2021).

By contrast, other scholars underscore how indigenous recognition and multiculturalism can deepen democracy by expanding rights and resources for disadvantaged groups and providing greater political space for non-dominant group self-identification (Madrid 2012, Van Cott 2008, Yashar 2005). Recognition is also symbolically important because of the history of discrimination, oppression, and inferiority associated with nonrecognition. As Van Cott (2005, 833) writes in the context of Latin America, "symbolic recognition after centuries of humiliation and domination is enormously important to Latin America's indigenous peoples, whose struggle is as much for substantive rights as it is for dignity and recognition of their status as peoples existing prior to the Latin American state." Recognition can therefore not only enhance confidence in government but also renew enthusiasm for participation and engagement in political life. Recent findings suggest that at least in some circumstances, recognizing identities and traditional authorities can both enhance indigenous self-identification and complement state authority (Baldwin 2015, McMurry 2022).

There is comparatively little empirical evidence on the effects of collective indigenous recognition relative to the rich theoretical literature on subnational identity more broadly. And the evidence that exists is structured in limited ways. Most important contributions use cross-sectional and cross-national comparisons (Behr 2018, Holzinger et al. 2018), which identify important trends but leave concerns about the causal direction and do not drill down into specific communities. One recent exception is McMurry (2022), though there the focus is on the link between recognition and state strength. While McMurry exploits variation in community recognition timing to estimate causal effects, the community-level consequences cannot be disaggregated to examine differences among individuals within communities.

At the individual level, there is work examining how indigenous identification is related to views of democracy and feelings of political and social inclusion (e.g., Fierro 2020, Trejo and Altamirano 2016). Scholars have also examined individual-level determinants of indigenous self-identification such as economic well-being, skin color, and education (e.g., Telles 2014). But these contributions do not speak to the impacts of policies of indigenous recognition per se, nor to how these policies might differentially impact groups within communities in systematic ways.

In contrast to these studies, I use wide spatial and temporal variation in recognition of indigenous communities within a single country and pair that with survey data in an effort to examine the causal impact of recognition on identity and views of democracy. This approach enables one of the first attempts to evaluate within-community consequences of recognition. This is important given that recognition, like other policy reforms, could have varying effects with target groups, especially when they provide limited or circumscribed benefits.

PERU'S INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES

Indigenous institutions and practices have long played a crucial role in Peruvian society.

Indigenous communities are at the heart of this. Many are located within Peru's mountainous highlands *sierra*, although they also extend to the coast and even into parts of the Amazon basin. Indigenous communities are groups of families that share a common territory; they represent the interests of their members and regulate access to resources, including land (Diez 2012).

Communities are nested within Peru's larger ethnic groups such as the Quechua and Aymara. They have territorial claims, are administered by community authorities, and are largely – but not exclusively – populated by indigenous citizens. Indigenous communities are the locus of various customary practices such as communal landholding and reciprocal work arrangements, and while these are still operative in most communities, they have declined in recent decades with market integration and development (Carter 2021). Many community members are bilingual speakers of both a native language and Spanish, though the share of people speaking an indigenous language as their mother tongue has declined from nearly 40% in 1961 to less than 20% today.

Today Peru's indigenous communities control over half of Peru's agricultural land and approximately one-third of the national territory (INEI 2014). Community members comprise roughly 11% of the country's population and their territories encompass an even larger portion of the population.[5] There are over 7,000 communities in total. Highlands and coastal communities known as "peasant communities" (*comunidades campesinas*) encompass over 6,100 of these and control the vast majority of indigenous territorial claims in the country; they also have a long history of relations with the state and private economic actors. Nonetheless, they remain highly autonomous: a 2012 census of peasant communities indicated that only 6% were affiliated with

[5] Data on community members are from the 2017 censuses of peasant communities and native communities. There is also a considerable population that self-identifies as indigenous but that does not live within communities. And many communities incorporate at least some individuals who are not inscribed in community registers, especially where they encompass growing urban areas.

other larger social or political organizations. Indigenous communities located in the Amazon basin (known as "native communities," or *comunidades nativas*) have been largely geographically isolated until recently and many remain so.

Indigenous communities have nonetheless changed and adapted substantially over time. Most were disrupted by Spanish colonialism through taxation, land and labor appropriation, and various forms of control. The first decades following independence in 1821 exacerbated their precarity by facilitating the sale and appropriation of communal lands into large landholdings known as haciendas. The government also ended policies defining indigenous communities as "Indian" and set out to assimilate and dominate indigenous peoples through a process of "mestizaje" (Remy 2013).

A new constitution in 1920 marked a change in this position by creating mechanisms to grant legal recognition to indigenous communities and reestablish rights to communal landholdings. This restored direct legal status and the recognition of communities as distinct entities that nonetheless belonged to the nation-state (Mallon 1983). Legal status also gave communities the capacity to interact with the state and public agencies as a group and enter into legal agreements with other neighboring communities and private outside actors, enhancing their bargaining power with outsiders and amplifying their voice in procuring government infrastructure and services.

But community recognition moved slowly initially. Only 783 communities had been recognized by 1940 and there was not a unified cartographic basis for land claims, leading to further encroachment. In subsequent decades the administrative competencies for communities spread across government agencies. For the majority of unrecognized communities, legal mechanisms enshrined in the 1920 constitution had little practical impact (Yashar 2005, 229).

A series of mass protests and land occupations by indigenous groups in the southern Andes in the early 1960s brought indigenous claims, particularly for land, back to the forefront. Many communities broke free from haciendas and reclaimed land in the late 1960s and 1970s through a major government land reform program. The land reform was part of a broader attempt by the government to craft a more unified and inclusive nation by moving away from ethnic categories (Seligmann 1995). The government dropped the term "Indian" and redefined indigenous communities as "peasant communities" in the Andes and "native communities" in the Amazon. These terms persisted, helping to demobilize "indigenous" as a salient political identity in Peru (Yashar 2005), though this has been shifting in recent decades.[6]

Few communities received full control of their own land during this period and only a minority of communities actually received legal recognition. Rather, most were incorporated into government-created land reform cooperatives and the state sought to impose new regulations through a 1970 statute such as the restructuring of private landholdings within communities as cooperative holdings, a new governing framework, and strict membership criteria (Bourque and Palmer 1975, 189-190). However, while the state sought to impose its authority and reach into communities, in practice it unintentionally enabled them to develop greater local autonomy and fostered traditional authority systems (Yashar 2005, 232-235).

A new wave of community recognition took place in the 1980s as land reform cooperatives broke up. Many communities took direct control of former cooperative land through that process and the government moved to legally recognize their new status (Castillo et al. 2004, 28). A pair of laws in 1987 accelerated this wave of recognition and regulation of communities, though they stopped short of offering formal political autonomy. These laws

[6] Communities themselves overwhelmingly prefer these terms, in part due to remaining popular stigma associated with being "indigenous."

advanced land surveying and the adjudication of community claims, regulated and recognized the governing bodies of communities, and defined the rights and duties of community members.

Community recognition continued throughout the 1990s up until the present as the benefits and legal requirements associated with state recognition have expanded. This most recent wave has shifted more shifted toward the subdivision of existing communities. Several factors have driven this trend (see, e.g., Bonfiglio 2017, Diez Hurtado 2012). The first is a set of state legal provisions and programs that protect community land as imprescriptible and relieve it of any tax burden, and that provide communities state funds and a consultative voice in rural public policies.[7] Some peripheral settlements of existing communities have broken off to take advantage of these benefits directly. The second is increased spending on social programs (such as titling programs and a housing program for community members displaced during Peru's civil war) and public financing of local government. Many districts centered these funds on central or urban areas, providing incentives for communities to form to capture and redirect local funds. The third is economic diversification, which has weakened the communal institutions of some communities and engendered community splits.

Figure 1 shows the growth in community recognition since the 1920s with data from the IBC/CEPES (SICCAM 2016). By 1998, over 5,600 indigenous communities – all of them peasant communities – had been recognized. Today communities number slightly over 6,100. This dynamic picture represents a "renaissance of Andean social groupings, under models more or less attuned to their own experiences" that nonetheless are undergoing constant organizational change and adaptation in response to modernization and outside forces (Mendoza 2004, 28).

[7] For instance, communities have access to the local participatory budget process and are eligible to serve as representatives of civil society in regional coordination councils. And in 2012 Congress approved the Law of Prior Consultation, requiring outside actors to consult directly communities prior to engaging in activities that would affect them.

Figure 1. Community Recognition in Peru



Community Life and Governance

Community practices and governance are central to the life of indigenous community members because of the participatory structure and autonomous nature of communities.[8] There are important commonalities across communities despite considerable variation in local practices. Community members can gain access to available community land, whether as family plots, access to communal lands, or both. Community members also hold "cargos," which are responsibilities to the community, such as serving on a night watch or planning community celebrations. Many communities practice various forms of unpaid reciprocal or community work assistance such as helping each other or the community during planting and harvesting times or contributing labor to public works projects such as road maintenance or constructing a new community building. Extensive and intertwined family and relative networks help to maintain a community spirit even when some of these more traditional practices fade (Mendoza 2004, 28).

Community members also participate in the community's main governing body, the General Assembly, which is a convening of the community for deliberative purposes. The

[8] According to the 2012 census of peasant communities, only 6% indicated any affiliation to outside organizations such as political parties.

General Assembly decides who can be a member of the community, deliberates on matters of fundamental importance to the community, controls community rules, appoints individuals to cargos, sanctions and punishes community members who violate rules, and elects a Governing Board. The Governing Board, in turn, serves as the governing and administrative body of the General Assembly and is its legal representative to outside actors and the Peruvian government.[9] Registered communities are required to place term limits on the Governing Board and have at least 30% representation of women.

Land and the Impact of State Recognition

Land is central to identity in Peru's indigenous communities. Communities have ancestral links to land and have long relied on its resources for their livelihoods. But land access is limited and there is a long history of tenure insecurity. Spanish colonists appropriated indigenous land and labor, reducing the land base of many communities. This process deepened following independence as large haciendas spread across the country, enveloping many communities and pushing others to marginal areas. By the early to mid-20th century, roughly 20,000 haciendas alone controlled over half the country's land (Albertus 2021). Population growth among communities since the early 20th century, especially as major advances in basic health pushed down high rates of infant mortality and extended lifespans, further strained land access.

Land reform restituted some lands to indigenous communities, but they were distinctly disadvantaged compared to resident middle-class hacienda workers (McClintock 1981). The result is that many communities have long faced land scarcity and insufficiency (Caballero and

[9] The governing structure of a General Assembly and Governing Board derives from the 1987 General Law of Peasant Communities. General assemblies, however, along with legal representatives, are longstanding traditions within communities.

Álvarez 1980).[10] This has contributed to enduring social and material disadvantages relative to Peru's mestizo majority, such as poverty, lower levels of education, and more limited access to healthcare (INEI 2017).

This backdrop, which most indigenous communities across the Americas and many elsewhere face, shapes the consequences of community recognition by the state. Official state recognition makes a community's land more secure and therefore more desirable. By recognizing and outlining community land claims, it mitigates conflict and incursions by outside groups. It also generates more stable and predictable land access within communities by fostering more autonomous community-based allocation. Land is more attractive not only for production but also as an insurance mechanism and retirement security – often key among rural populations (Thiesenhusen 1989) – when its possession is more secure. Unrecognized communities face greater land precarity and have had to navigate shifting state-imposed guidelines over land use and allocation within communities that can considerably shuffle existing land use patterns. Finally, community recognition also enhances the prospects for and consultation in state investments in infrastructure and benefits.

I anticipate that these dynamics will drive up demand for land and investment in community life among eligible community members. Furthermore, this should operate most strongly among those who are at or near the age of qualifying for community land access. Reaching adulthood in a community brings with it the right to become a community member (*comunero*), vote in the general assembly, participate in adult-oriented community organizations, and, critically, to claim community land. Adults and near-adults are therefore most likely to win greater access to community land in the wake of recognition, to invest in community life and

[10] For an illustrative and illuminating discussion of this in the context of Puno, see Jacobsen (1993, Ch. 7).

governance, and to develop a strong sense of community pride and identity. Adults at the time of recognition are especially well positioned because they already qualify for land access. Furthermore, and not entirely separately, having come of age in an unrecognized community and experienced community recognition as adults, they should be especially cognizant of the symbolic and governance impacts of official recognition. I expect these cohorts to develop more positive views of how democracy functions due to their participatory role in community life, and to vest greater confidence in the regional governments that are chiefly responsible for community recognition and policy administration.

Individuals who are very young at the time of community recognition and those born after recognition are less likely to gain access to community land resources where there is scarcity. Recognition for these cohorts may be mostly symbolic, to the extent that is transmitted across generations, and less material in nature – though the consequences may still be considerable compared to similar nearby non-community members.

DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN

I examine data on communities along with their formal recognition status and pair these data with individual survey respondents' self-identification and views on the government and democracy. The individual-level data I utilize is from a pooled sample of households from the Peruvian National Household Survey (ENAHO) for the period 2007-2020. ENAHO is the official annual household survey run by the Peruvian National Institute of Statistics to monitor household living conditions and public opinion on a range of issues. This survey is representative at the national, urban, rural, and various regional levels. It contains detailed data about households and individual economic, demographic, and social characteristics.

Beginning in 2007, ENAHO introduced geolocation for respondents, which enables

linking respondents the specific communities. It also includes information on respondent year of birth, allowing assignment of exposure to recognition at a certain point in an individual's life. Between 2007 and 2020, the average number of individuals surveyed per year was 72,000.[11]

Community Recognition

Community recognition is an official designation that is granted through a government decree. It provides a community legal status as an entity with rights and duties as well as recognition of an imprescriptible claim over the land it holds. Communities are subject to legal regulations regarding internal organization. Recognition supports self-management and makes communities eligible for selected state programs and services, gives them greater access to participatory local budget-making, provides selected tax exemptions, and can enhance their bargaining power with private firms and other levels of government (Bonfiglio 2017, Diez Hurtado 2012).

Data on the status and timing of community recognition are from the Instituto del Bien Común (IBC) and the Centro Peruano de Estudios Sociales (CEPES). These data combine several disparate databases of communities managed by different state agencies: the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Culture, and the Organization for the Formalization of Informal Property (COFOPRI). The IBC and CEPES cross-checked these sources against one another, investigated secondary sources, and visited regional governments and archives to verify information and acquire additional community maps. The resulting dataset records a total of 6,138 recognized peasant communities (SICCAM 2016). It also records 1,129 native communities, nearly all of which have not been officially recognized and are therefore not included in the analysis.

[11] Further ENAHO sampling and coverage details are in the Appendix. It contains 182,111 respondents from identified communities and covers 1,763 communities.

Assigning Individuals to Communities

ENAHO collects geocoded information on where survey respondents live. This is critical because neither ENAHO nor any other major household survey collect data on which community an individual belongs to.

Assigning individuals to unique communities requires a complex intermediate step: mapping the territorial extent of communities. The most comprehensive and reliable source of community boundaries comes from a shapefile produced by the IBC. The IBC maps boundaries for 69% of Peru's 6,138 communities. Remaining communities are not assigned a territorial polygon.

I extend this data source in two ways. First, I build on it using a recent map of communities produced by COFOPRI. This map has very high overlap with the IBC data and adds a cartographic basis for an additional 1% of communities. Next, I turn to data from the Ministry of Culture's Database of Indigenous Communities (BDPI). The BDPI provides a list of populated areas that pertain to each indigenous community. From this data source and the geolocation of populated areas, I create an additional series of polygons that incorporate populated areas uniquely assigned to a community with a one-kilometer buffer around them. This covers another 23% of all communities. Most of these additional polygons constructed from BDPI data do not overlap with polygons from the other data sources.[12]

Combining these data sources yields the most comprehensive cartographic basis for Peru's communities to date. It covers 93% of all officially recognized communities.[13]

[12] See Appendix for more details on methods used constructing polygons from the BDPI data.
[13] The remaining 7% of communities cannot be clearly located and assigned a polygon because their geographic extent is not indicated in any of these data sources. Of the nearly 5,700 communities with a cartographic basis, 84% were recognized and titled as of 2017.

Figure 2 displays a map of indigenous peasant communities across Peru's national territory. They are concentrated in the Andean highlands, especially in southern and central parts of the country. There are also peasant communities on the northern and central coast, and the government has begun recognizing a small number of peasant settler communities in the Amazon basin.[14]

Figure 2. Indigenous Communities Across Peru



Outcomes Linked to Identity and Views of Government

In estimating the effects of official community recognition, I examine several outcomes linked to identity and views of government. I examine two outcomes linked to identity. The first captures self-identification with an indigenous community over other groups. When asked which group they feel most identified with, individuals can indicate (i) their department, province,

[14] Many of these are offshoots of established communities that run short of land with demographic growth.

district, or town; (ii) their ethnicity or race; (iii) their peasant or indigenous community; (iv) their religious group or position; (v) other. I code indigenous community self-identification among those who choose answer (iii). This is a far more salient identification and marker of indigeneity than ethnicity or race. Within communities, less than 2% of individuals identified first with their ethnicity or race whereas over 34% identified with their community. Given weak ethnic ties and cross-community interaction in Peru (e.g., Madrid 2012, Yashar 2005), community identity is the lens into indigenous identity.[15]

A second identity outcome captures whether a respondent, or a household member, reports being formally inscribed in a community. This variable was only added to the survey beginning in 2012. It is worth noting that this outcome differs from the first: an individual may report being a member of a community but principally identify along other lines.

I also examine how community recognition impacts views of democratic functioning and confidence in government. On democratic functioning, respondents rank how well they believe democracy functions on a scale of very poorly (1) to very well (4). This question does not cue them to think about national-level or local-level democratic practice but is instead general in nature. It asks about democracy in the present rather than in a retrospective sense. In terms of government confidence, I focus on confidence in regional (departmental) government since this administrative level is responsible for nearly all of the bureaucratic process of community recognition from receiving and processing initial petitions to inspecting community territorial

[15] This is despite the fact that approximately 50% of community residents in the ENAHO sample self-identify as Quechuan and about 5% as Aymaran, the two largest non-mestizo ethnic groups represented. I also examined the effects of recognition on ethnic self-identification, coding indigenous self-identification for respondents who identified as Quechuan, Aymaran, native to the Amazon, or from another indigenous group in Peru. This question was asked in ENAHO from 2012-2020. Results were sensitive to model specification, varying from statistically insignificant to a small 1-2% boost in indigenous self-identification for adults and near-adults compared to the youngest cohorts at the time of recognition.

claims, gathering input from neighboring communities, and emitting final decisions on recognition. Regions pass along final documentation to the national level for inscription in national registers, but this has little additional consequence. Regions also formulate and administer policies for communities in their jurisdiction.[16] Survey respondents are asked simply whether they have confidence in their regional government on a scale of none (1) to a lot (4).[17]

Descriptive statistics for these and other variables are in the Appendix.

Controls

The analysis also includes several control variables from the ENAHO survey.[18] I include variables for gender and education age since individuals may differ in self-identification and their views of government based on these factors. Another control is whether an individuals' mother tongue is a native, non-Spanish language. This is a less immediately malleable marker of indigeneity and may be linked not only to how an individual relates to the state but also the importance they place on community recognition and identity.

Estimation Framework

I combine the community-linked household survey data, including birth year, with data on the timing of community recognition to examine the impact of official community recognition on identity and views of government. This approach enables the estimation of a difference-in-differences specification in which an individual's residence within a community and date of birth jointly determine their exposure to community recognition and the conditions that preceded or followed it. This facilitates the comparison of individuals who were born into already recognized

[16] Accordingly, I find no impact of recognition on trust in national government.
[17] The specific wording of each of these survey questions is in the Appendix.
[18] Results are also similar when including community-level controls for geography, agricultural suitability, road access, mining presence, and prehispanic ceremonial sites. I do not include them in the analyses here because these variables are generally statistically significant and also reduce the sample size.

communities to those who were young at the time of recognition and those who were in older cohorts and became adults prior to the recognition of their community, zooming in on a range of age brackets of interest including those around the cutoff of adulthood.[19]

This type of age cohort analysis has been widely used in economics to examine relationships such as how school construction impacts educational achievement (Duflo 2001) and how civil conflict shapes human capital accumulation (Leon 2012). It has rarely been employed in political science.

Identifying an individual's year of birth and community of residence enables calculating how old each individual was when a community was recognized and therefore how it may have impacted them.[20] As discussed previously, adults are likely to be particularly impacted by community recognition. I use this information to compare self-identification and views of government among those affected by community recognition as adults with those of younger cohorts that are less well positioned to claim valuable and scarce community resources like land.

I estimate the impact of community recognition on identity and views of democracy using the following regression specification, which exploits both birth cohort and geographical variation in recognition:

$$(1) \qquad y_{ijt} = \alpha + \sum_{l=0}^{n} (R_j \cdot d_{il})\beta_l + X'_{ijt}\delta + \omega_j + \varphi_t + \varepsilon_{ijt}$$

[19] The estimations incorporate all people residing in communities rather than just self-reported community members because membership itself can be shaped by recognition. Furthermore, individuals who are not reported as community members may nonetheless have close community ties, for instance minors and unmarried women who may not be formally inscribed as community members. In later analysis I restrict the sample to communities smaller than 10,000 people; these communities are least likely to contain outsiders who may nonetheless reside within a community (e.g., in an urban area).

[20] I use current community of residence to proxy for which community an individual lived in at the time of recognition given that the latter are not available. Results are similar when restricting the sample to individuals who remained in their district of birth during their lifetime, since these are the individuals who are most likely to have remained in their communities for life.

where y_{ijt} is the outcome of interest for individual i located in community j in year t. R_j is a dummy variable for community recognition in community j and d_{il} is a dummy that indicates whether individual i is age l in the year of community recognition. Individuals born after community recognition form the control group, and this dummy is omitted from the regression.[21] X_{ijt} is a vector of individual characteristics, including mother tongue, gender, and years of education. ω_j are district fixed effects and φ_t are year of birth fixed effects.[22]

District fixed effects help to capture heterogeneity across space in self-identification and views of government for unobserved reasons, such as state presence or inter-community ties. I also cluster standard errors at this level. Birth year fixed effects capture potential time trends in self-identification and views of government; they therefore ensure that the findings are *not driven by broader age-related trends*. For instance, younger cohorts might be systematically more (or less) likely to self-identify as indigenous for reasons unrelated to their exposure to community recognition, and birth year fixed effects would absorb this trend. Each coefficient β_l in Equation (1) can be interpreted as an estimate of the impact of community recognition on a given birth cohort. I generate estimates using a linear probability model because this facilitates interpretation of the coefficients and is far more efficient than estimating probit or logit regressions given the large number of fixed effects and clusters for estimating standard errors.[23]

One potential concern about the estimation approach is the possibility of errors in individuals' reported age. Missing information on the month of birth or mistakes in reported age

[21] Results are similar if the control group is restricted to individuals born only in the 10 years following community recognition.
[22] There can be anywhere between one and several communities in a given district. Results are generally similar using community fixed effects, though estimates can be less precise given that small communities may only have a few individuals sampled in the household survey, rendering their outcomes colinear with the fixed effects and dummies and exacerbating potential bias due to small samples. See Appendix for the distribution of sampled individuals by community.
[23] Results are robust to using alternative estimators such as probit models when the outcome is binary.

(e.g., due to transcription or the lack of a birth certificate) could lead to assigning exposure to community recognition with a margin of error. Estimating a large number of age cohort year dummies can also generate inefficient estimates. I minimize these potential problems by principally analyzing recognition exposure across age cohort groups of interest and theoretical relevance rather than assigning it to specific years of birth. I define the following groups: those born after recognition, those who were young at the time of recognition (0-12), teenagers who were not of age at recognition (13-17), young adults at recognition (18-25), mature adults at recognition (26-40), and older adults at recognition (41-65).[24] The estimation of Equation (1) is therefore conducted using age cohort group dummy interactions instead of age cohort year dummy interactions.

Figure 3. Survey Respondents by Year of Birth and Age at Time of Community Recognition



Figure 3 displays the distribution of survey respondents by year of birth and age at the time of community recognition. There are individuals in the household survey born between 1920 and the 2000s, though most are born between the 1940s and 1990s. This time period spans over 80% of the communities recognized in Peru. There are also a considerable number of observations across age brackets at the time of community recognition. While many sampled

[24] The results are robust to the specific choice of ages grouped together.

individuals were born into already recognized communities, there are also a large number of people who were young or adults at the time of recognition. The sample becomes sparser for those who were in their fifties or older at the time of recognition.

RESULTS

Table 1 presents the main results of how the state recognition of indigenous communities impacts identity and views of democracy among individuals within communities.[25] Columns 1-4 use the full sample of communities. Column 1 indicates that older adults – those older 25 at the time of recognition – are most likely to self-identify as a member of an indigenous community over other identities. These individuals are 3-4 percentage points more likely to do so than the omitted comparison group of those who were born into a recognized community. This compares to 34% of individuals within communities who self-identify most closely with their indigenous community. Younger individuals are indistinguishable from those born after recognition. Further analysis indicates that the effects for adults are driven by a decline in identifying with one's region or town.

The effects of recognition on self-reported community membership are in Column 2. Young adults age 18-25 and teenagers age 13-17 at the time of recognition are most likely to claim community membership after official recognition. These cohorts are 3.8-4.6% more likely to claim community membership than individuals born after community recognition. This is considerable given that about 41% of individuals within communities claim membership. Adults age 26-40 and younger individuals age 0-12 at the time of recognition are also more likely to

[25] Raw data on the main outcomes by age at the time of community recognition versus year of birth are strongly suggestive of the age cohort-level effects of recognition and support the findings that follow. See the Appendix for figures.

claim community membership than the comparison group, though the magnitude of the effects, particularly for the young, declines considerably relative to teenagers and young adults.

Table 1. Community Recognition, Identity, and Views of Government

					Communities < 10,000 people			
	Self-Identifies with Community	Community Member	Feels Democracy Works Well	Trust in Regonal Government	Self-Identifies with Community	Community Member	Feels Democracy Works Well	Trust in Regonal Government
Age at Recognition								
Young (0-12)	0.009	0.023**	0.008	-0.008	0.011	0.028***	0.017*	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Teenager (13-17)	0.012	0.046***	0.012	0.021	0.016*	0.054***	0.019	0.028*
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Young adult (18-25)	0.006	0.038**	0.037***	0.033**	0.010	0.047***	0.046***	0.037**
	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Adult (26-40)	0.031***	0.031*	0.049***	0.054***	0.035***	0.046**	0.054***	0.065***
	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.018)
Adult (41-65)	0.039**	0.022	0.067***	0.042*	0.048***	0.043*	0.080***	0.047*
	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.025)
Controls								
Native mother tongue	0.057***	0.077***	0.033***	-0.022**	0.055***	0.080***	0.035***	-0.020*
	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Female	-0.012***	-0.029***	-0.011***	-0.006**	-0.013***	-0.032***	-0.014***	-0.005
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Years of education	-0.006***	-0.007***	-0.012***	-0.000	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.013***	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.054	0.347	2.311***	1.327***	0.117	0.376	1.589***	1.384***
	(0.153)	(0.234)	(0.503)	(0.293)	(0.178)	(0.272)	(0.021)	(0.428)
Year of birth FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
District FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	166,623	121,090	134,869	133,107	143,172	102,987	113,232	111,614
R-squared	0.164	0.536	0.067	0.079	0.141	0.469	0.073	0.082
Districts	824	811	821	822	786	773	783	784

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses.

Column 3 reports results on views of how well democracy functions. The effects are again concentrated among adults. All adult cohorts over age 18 at the time of community recognition report that democracy functions better than the comparison group of individuals born after recognition. The estimated effects are statistically strong and range from 0.037-0.067. This is approximately one-tenth of a standard deviation of this variable, which in turn represents a shift from reporting, for instance, that democracy works well versus poorly. Those who were young at the time of recognition are indistinguishable from those born after recognition.

The estimated impact of recognition on trust in regional government are in Column 4. Again, adult cohorts report greater trust in regional government, which is the key administrative level at which the process of community recognition operates. Estimated effects range from

0.033-0.054 for adult cohorts over age 18 compared to post-recognition birth cohorts. This compares to an average of 1.7 for this variable on a four-point scale.

The results in Columns 1-4 represent a durability in the shift in identity and views of government following community recognition. Differences among cohorts are observed even decades after recognition.[26]

The remaining columns in Table 1 replication Columns 1-4 but restrict the sample to communities with less than 10,000 inhabitants as calculated using community polygons and individual-level geolocated data from the 2007 census. Whereas the effects are anticipated to operate most strongly among those who are, could plausibly become, or have close ties to, community members, there are some communities whose boundaries incorporate a considerable number of outsiders who are not impacted by recognition. This is particularly true of communities that contain urban centers. Individuals from elsewhere can migrate to these areas in search of employment or educational opportunities but do not interact with the local community. Communities with less than 10,000 inhabitants – which constitute 98% of identified communities and contain 85% of community respondents – are those least likely to be impacted by these dynamics.[27] Their more rural character also makes land more central to community life.

As anticipated, the results in Columns 5-8 are similar to those in Columns 1-4 but generally strengthen in both statistical and substantive significance. These columns now pick up

[26] For instance, the results hold when restricting to communities recognized prior to 1990.
[27] Results are not sensitive to this particular threshold choice. They are also similar when taking a different approach: restricting only to people who were born in the same district where they reside at the time of being surveyed by ENAHO. This alternative approach, however, is also imperfect in that it could retain individuals who have moved into a community from elsewhere in the same district. It also excludes individuals who could indeed be community members, such as women who marry into a community from outside of it. Finally, results also generally strengthen when focusing on communities that report having communal land in addition to allocating community land to households, and to communities that retain reciprocal work practices like *ayni* and *minka*. Data on these variables are from the 2012 Census of Communities.

some minor, residual effects among younger cohorts but mainly indicate stronger results among adults and near-adults.

Mechanisms

What explains why adults and near-adults at the time of recognition are most likely to report identifying with their community and to express positive assessments of democracy and regional government? Several pieces of information suggest that land access and associated investment in community life is a driving mechanism.

Full membership in a community, including the right to vote in the general assembly and the right to access community land, is only extended to participating individuals after they reach adulthood. This is important because it shapes individual choices following community recognition. As previously discussed, official recognition makes community land more secure and gives communities greater access to benefits, increasing demand for land and investment in community life among eligible community members. Adults and near-adults are positioned to most quickly act on this in the years immediately following recognition as they make choices about where to live and what type of employment to seek. Other younger cohorts, including those born after recognition, could in theory respond to these incentives in similar ways – unless land is scarce and has already been largely claimed by other community members. Because first movers who win more community land and invest in community life develop power and authority within communities, and because of strong norms of respecting prior decisions and seniority, younger cohorts and especially those born after recognition find it more difficult to access sufficient community resources as a livelihood and are therefore less likely to be impacted by recognition.

Table 2 examines these hypotheses. It again restricts the sample to smaller communities

to focus on rural areas. The dependent variable in Column 1 is the log size of land owned by an individual. Column 2 is a dummy variable for whether an individual works in agriculture. These columns indicate that adults and near-adults at the time of recognition are more likely to hold larger plots of land within the community and to work in agriculture compared to those born after recognition. Young adults, for instance, hold on average 0.1 more hectares of land (about one-quarter acre) than those born after recognition. This compares to an average landholding of of about 0.75 hectares, or 1.85 acres. These trends increase with age and likely with power and seniority in a community.

Table 2. Mechanisms

	Landholding Size	Works in Agriculture	Belongs to a Ronda Campesina
Age at Recognition			
Young (0-12)	0.054***	0.008	0.006**
	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.003)
Teenagers (13-17)	0.070***	0.021**	0.007*
	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.004)
Young adults (18-25)	0.079***	0.021**	0.012**
	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.005)
Adults (26-40)	0.092***	0.022*	0.011**
	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.005)
Adults (41-65)	0.097***	0.028*	0.015**
	(0.029)	(0.016)	(0.007)
Controls			
Native mother tongue	0.043***	0.058***	0.004*
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.002)
Female	-0.040***	-0.030***	-0.006***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Years of education	0.001	-0.011***	-0.001***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Constant	0.239***	0.801***	0.031***
	(0.083)	(0.179)	(0.009)
Year of birth FE	YES	YES	YES
District FE	YES	YES	YES
Observations	155,155	155,155	147,615
R-squared	0.355	0.379	0.353
Districts	821	821	786

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses. All models restrict to communities with less than 10,000 people.

Column 3 turns to participation in a core institution in rural communities: *rondas campesinas*. These are local citizen policing groups that conduct night watches and guard against incursions and disruptions by outsiders. Its members are typically well-respected and trusted

members of the community. While all age cohorts born before recognition are more likely to participate in a ronda campesina than individuals born after recognition, the magnitude of the effects are twice as large for adults at the time of recognition.

In short, Table 2 indicates that recognition encourages those who are best positioned in its immediate aftermath – adults and near-adults – to gain more access to community land and invest in community life. This path in turn strongly shapes self-identification and local community participation over time, including in democratic deliberation through assemblies and working with other levels of local government. Adults and near-adults at the time of recognition are also best positioned to appreciate the symbolic importance of recognition, though that is harder to test separately from the land and local participation channel.

Table 3 presents a different piece of evidence linked to the importance of land and land scarcity in shaping the effects of recognition. This table returns to the full set of communities and the dependent variables from Table 3 but splits the sample into communities within the highlands Sierra region and communities on Peru's coast.[28] Land is particularly important to community life – and land constraints are particularly acute – in the rugged highlands Sierra region where land quality is relatively poor and irrigation very limited despite the importance of agricultural and pastoralist lifestyles (Caballero and Álvarez 1980, Jacobsen 1993). Coastal communities, by contrast, are more likely to have corporate bodies and businesses through which members earn income and livelihoods (Mendoza 2004). This makes land and land constraints less salient on the coast. The intergenerational effects of recognition in coastal communities should therefore mainly operate in the highlands and be far more muted or nonexistent on the coast.

The results in Table 3 accord with these expectations. The findings from highlands

[28] I follow common practice and define highlands areas as districts above 1,500 meters above sea level.

communities are largely similar to those in Columns 1-4 of Table 1 and are somewhat stronger. By contrast, there are no consistent discernible patterns among age cohorts within coastal communities.

Table 3. Impacts of Recognition in the Highlands Versus the Coast

	Highlands				Coast			
	Self-Identifies with Community	Community Member	Feels Democracy Works Well	Trust in Regonal Government	Self-Identifies with Community	Community Member	Feels Democracy Works Well	Trust in Regonal Government
Age at Recognition								
Young (0-12)	0.012	0.026**	0.014	-0.007	-0.022	-0.005	-0.030	-0.023
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.034)	(0.021)	(0.034)
Teenagers (13-17)	0.015	0.050***	0.015	0.025	-0.032	0.004	-0.034	-0.011
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.050)	(0.032)	(0.047)
Young adults (18-25)	0.013	0.045***	0.035**	0.029*	-0.070***	0.000	0.045	0.080*
	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.058)	(0.031)	(0.043)
Adults (26-40)	0.036***	0.040**	0.045***	0.063***	-0.034	-0.003	0.055	-0.067
	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.040)	(0.079)	(0.045)	(0.054)
Adults (41-65)	0.047***	0.035	0.070***	0.047*	-0.116***	-0.044	-0.015	-0.002
	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.041)	(0.103)	(0.065)	(0.073)
Controls								
Native mother tongue	0.056***	0.080***	0.034***	-0.020**	-0.005	0.025	-0.008	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.061)	(0.040)
Female	-0.013***	-0.034***	-0.015***	-0.005	-0.005*	-0.010**	-0.003	-0.008
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Years of education	-0.007***	-0.008***	-0.013***	0.000	-0.004***	-0.003**	-0.007***	-0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.082	0.428	2.303***	1.283***	0.047*	-0.086	3.004***	0.837***
	(0.153)	(0.281)	(0.510)	(0.300)	(0.028)	(0.064)	(0.036)	(0.074)
Year of birth FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
District FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	140,235	99,412	110,417	109,224	21,485	18,026	20,023	19,526
R-squared	0.133	0.454	0.073	0.075	0.151	0.372	0.065	0.059
Districts	798	784	794	795	464	399	439	437

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

There are several alternative explanations that could undercut the argument that the effects of community recognition vary across age groups within communities due to land access and associated investment in community life: wealth effects, experiences with discrimination, and democratic "learning."

Community recognition may not only increase demand for community land and shape investment in community life through land ownership. It may also channel greater ad hoc benefits to communities such as access to selected government spending programs, though there are no comprehensive or enduring catch-all programs for communities. Adults and near-adults at the time

of recognition may be best positioned to capture these benefits and do so in ways that give them enduring power and advantages within the community. They may have especially strong incentives to identify with their community to win other benefits, can use them to shape local democracy to their advantage, and foster links to regional bureaucracies that enhance their reported confidence in government. Column 1 of Table 4 tests this proposition using data on annual household expenditures as a proxy for wealth.[29] In contrary to this alternative, adults at the time of recognition are *less wealthy* than individuals born after recognition by an estimated 3-9% depending on the cohort. That these cohorts have larger landholdings but less wealth is consistent with working in the agricultural sector and investing in community life, which is not lucrative compared to outside opportunities but which does deeply shape the nature of involvement in local governance.

A second alternative explanation is that adults and near-adults at the time of recognition may win greater respect from the state and in society more broadly. They may consequently face less discrimination from government offices, private businesses, in education, and other everyday interactions. This could in turn enhance pride in indigenous identity, encourage investment in community life through membership, and enhance perceptions of democracy and confidence in regional government. Meanwhile, these effects may fade among younger cohorts who did not directly fight for recognition and did not experience recognition firsthand. Outsiders may also return to stigmatizing these younger cohorts. Column 2 of Table 4 tests this alternative using self-reported data on whether individuals have experienced discrimination by state institutions, the private sector, or in society in the previous year. This variable is only available in ENAHO surveys from 2014-2019. Aside from a small negative effect among young adults, there are no consistent impacts of recognition on experiences of discrimination.

[29] Expenditures are often a better proxy than self-reported income in contexts like these, though the latter also yields similar results.

Table 4. Alternative Explanations

	Annual Household Expenditure	Discrimination	Democratic Learning
Age at Recognition			
Young (0-12)	0.005	-0.006	-0.014*
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Teenagers (13-17)	0.005	-0.005	-0.007
	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Young adults (18-25)	-0.027*	-0.016**	0.001
	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.011)
Adults (26-40)	-0.044**	-0.004	0.000
	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Adults (41-65)	-0.086***	-0.007	-0.009
	(0.026)	(0.010)	(0.017)
Controls			
Native mother tongue	-0.061***	-0.001	-0.012*
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Female	0.035***	-0.005	0.023***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Years of education	0.038***	0.008***	0.015***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	7.875***	-0.087	3.008***
	(0.385)	(0.105)	(0.036)
Year of birth FE	YES	YES	YES
District FE	YES	YES	YES
Observations	181,578	38,293	143,213
R-squared	0.433	0.091	0.041
Districts	859	738	823

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses.

A third alternative explanation is democratic "learning." Adults and near-adults at the time of community recognition may be more likely to realize that democracy is especially important for fulfilling their demands and over time become more committed democrats than younger cohorts who are not positioned to understand recognition as a lived experience in the same way. In turn, democratic learning among older cohorts may shape their views of identity and inclusion in democracy and their confidence in government. Column 3 of Table 4 tests this alternative using a survey question on the overall importance of democracy. Responses range from not important (1) to very important (4). Aside from a marginally significant and substantively weak negative coefficient among young cohorts, there are no distinguishable differences among age groups within communities. While adults and near-adults are more likely than post-recognition cohorts to report

that democracy functions well, they are not more likely to assess it as especially important.[30]

BROADER EFFECTS OF RECOGNITION

While the results demonstrate clear intergenerational heterogeneity in the effects of indigenous community recognition consistent with a land access mechanism, they do not speak to the broader effects of recognition on communities and their inhabitants as a whole. Recognition may have impacts on all cohorts, whether born before or after recognition.

To estimate the potentially broader effects of recognition, I compare individuals who live within indigenous communities to rural individuals from the same district sampled by ENAHO who live outside of communities.[31] I include the same individual-level controls as in Tables 1-4. I also include year of birth fixed effects to control for potential trends in identity and views of government over time and district fixed effects to limit the comparison set of individuals to those who are geographically proximate to recognized communities. To ensure that the estimates are also sensitive to the generational effects in prior analyses, I compare age cohorts of individuals within communities at the time of recognition to outside rural individuals at similar ages at the time of community recognition.[32]

The results, presented in Table 5, indicate that recognition boosts indigenous self-identification and reported community membership across all age cohorts within communities,

[30] In further analysis, I split the sample into communities recognized during periods of democracy and those recognized during periods of dictatorship. Results are similar in both groups.
[31] I define rural individuals as those living in towns with less than 20,000 people. Although it would be ideal to compare individuals from recognized communities to otherwise similar individuals in as-yet unrecognized communities that could in theory be recognized in the future, there is no such register of communities. Another alternative would be to use a difference-in-differences approach to estimate effects in communities recognized during the ENAHO sample period from 2007-2020. However, there are only six of these communities with individuals sampled both before and after recognition, raising issues of external validity, and all of the sampled individuals are adults born before recognition.
[32] Where there is more than one community recognized in a district, I create age cohorts for individuals living outside communities based on the median community recognition year.

albeit to a considerably greater degree among adults and near-adults. However, the effects of recognition on assessments of how well democracy works are only statistically distinguishable for adult cohorts compared to the general population. And there are few discernible effects for trust in regional government. Individuals who are young at the time of recognition or born after it express, if anything, somewhat less confidence in regional government compared to the general population and adults express somewhat more confidence.

Table 5. Broader Effects of Recognition

	Self-Identifies with Community	Community Member	Feels Democracy Works Well	Trust in Regonal Government
Age at Recognition				
Unborn (born after recognition)	0.055***	0.126***	0.014	-0.018
	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Young (0-12)	0.063***	0.141***	0.018	-0.025*
	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Teenagers (13-17)	0.065***	0.154***	0.019	-0.002
	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.019)
Young adults (18-25)	0.059***	0.149***	0.037**	0.011
	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.019)
Adults (26-40)	0.086***	0.142***	0.050***	0.027
	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.018)
Adults (41-65)	0.096***	0.123***	0.059***	0.018
	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.027)
Controls				
Native mother tongue	0.066***	1.150***	0.026***	-0.028***
	(0.006)	(0.127)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Female	-0.015***	-0.295***	-0.007***	-0.010***
	(0.002)	(0.035)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Years of education	-0.007***	-0.104***	-0.011***	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.160	-1.795	2.199***	1.735***
	(0.128)	(1.100)	(0.349)	(0.389)
Year of birth FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
District FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	211,077	216,924	271,607	168,595
R-squared	0.142	0.324	0.059	0.076
Districts	758	758	779	758

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses.

Overall, the Table 5 findings echo the previous age-based effects within communities and underscore their importance even when compared to broader population-level effects. The broader effects of recognition on young and post-recognition cohorts are decidedly more muted than for adults and near-adults who are best positioned to win greater access to scarce

community land and invest in community life following recognition. The remaining effects on identity and community membership for those who are young at the time of recognition and those born after recognition may speak to the remaining symbolic power and other benefits of recognition not strictly related to land.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Governments around the world have grappled with – and continue to grapple with – how to reconcile with their indigenous communities. Among the many policies they employ, collective recognition of indigenous claims to land and traditional authority is central. How does recognition in turn shape identity and views of democracy within communities themselves?

This paper examines this question through an ambitious and longstanding program of indigenous community recognition in Peru. I find that recognition supports indigenous community self-identification, community membership, positive views of democratic functioning, and confidence in government. The effects are particularly strong among adults and near-adults at the time of recognition and some wane or even disappear for younger cohorts. I attribute this to the fact that adults and near-adults are best positioned to win greater access to scarce community land and invest in community life immediately post-recognition.

The findings hold important implications for the treatment of indigenous communities and land restitution. Indigenous communities around the globe have faced land dispossession and exploitation through colonial and postcolonial attempts at extermination, assimilation, and marginalization. This has dramatically reduced, and in some cases entirely eliminated, traditional landholdings and homelands.

Recognizing and supporting what remains within communities is an important start, and can have enduring consequences, but it is not sufficient to reconstitute vibrant communities and

identities. As in Peru, scarcities in core resources like land mean that not all would-be community members have a realistic opportunity to fully partake in community life. As those first in line access scarce benefits and hold onto them, other individuals need access to additional policies of support and restitution, such as in-kind payments along the lines being made in South Africa for victims of land dispossession, in order to eliminate the negative consequences of material scarcity within communities.

The findings also raise important considerations for future studies of the consequences of indigenous recognition. Attention to the intergenerational consequences of recognition is important if scholars and policymakers are to appropriately gauge net impact. For instance, if recognition policies are recent and effects are measured only among adults, that may overestimate long-term consequences by failing to consider how access to benefits can attenuate among subsequent cohorts.

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Appendix

Indigenous Community Recognition, Identity, and Democracy: Evidence from Peru

Michael Albertus

Contents

I. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
How well democracy works (1=very bad, 4=very good)	134,869	2.44	0.66	1	4
Trust in regional government (1=none, 4=a lot)	133,107	1.70	0.78	1	4
Self-identifies with community	166,623	0.34	0.47	0	1
Community member	121,090	0.58	0.49	0	1
Lives in Coast	181,578	0.14	0.35	0	1
Lives in Highlands	181,578	0.83	0.38	0	1
Lives in Amazon	181,578	0.03	0.17	0	1
Born after community recognized	181,578	0.62	0.49	0	1
Young (0-12) when community recognized	181,578	0.15	0.35	0	1
Teenagers (13-17) when community recognized	181,578	0.05	0.21	0	1
Young adults (18-25) when community recognized	181,578	0.06	0.24	0	1
Adults (26-40) when community recognized	181,578	0.08	0.27	0	1
Adults (41-65) when CC was recognized	181,578	0.05	0.21	0	1
Log household annual expenditure (soles)	181,578	9.39	0.75	4.8	12.2
Log size of land owned (hectares)	181,578	0.57	0.74	0	6.9
Works on agricultural activities dummy	181,578	0.72	0.45	0	1
Belongs to a ronda campesina	172,678	0.05	0.22	0	1
Experienced any form of discrimination	38,293	0.11	0.31	0	1
Importance of democracy (1=not important, 4=very important)	143,213	2.96	0.63	1	4
Native mother tongue	181,578	0.51	0.50	0	1
Female	181,578	0.52	0.50	0	1
Years of education	181,578	6.49	4.86	0	21

II. Constructing Community Polygons

The most comprehensive and reliable source of community boundaries comes from a shapefile produced by the IBC. The IBC maps boundaries for 4,236 (69%) of Peru's 6,138 communities. I extend this data source in two ways. First, I build on it using a recent map of communities produced by COFOPRI. This map has very high overlap with the IBC data and adds a cartographic basis for an additional 64 communities (1% of all communities).

Next, I turn to data from the Ministry of Culture's Database of Indigenous Communities (BDPI). The BDPI provides a list of populated areas that pertain to each indigenous community. I first matched indigenous communities from the BDPI data to the SICCAM dataset described in the paper based on department, province, district, and community names. From this data merge and the geolocation of populated areas from BDPI, I create an additional series of community polygons that incorporate populated areas uniquely assigned to a community with a one-kilometer buffer around them.

These polygons were created through an iterated process described below. They cover 1,379 communities (23% of all communities).

1. Identify polygons drawn from BDPI data that do not overlap IBC/Cofopri polygons and that do not overlap with each other. There are 465 of these polygons, constituting 8% of all communities.
2. Identify polygons drawn from BDPI data that intersect partially but not entirely with IBC/Cofopri polygons. This could occur because of the convexity of polygons created using BDPI data based on populated areas or if a community has a border conflict with an existing community that is fully mapped and verified by IBC/Cofopri. Most of these overlaps are small compared to overall community polygons. I "cut" the overlapping portion of these polygons, giving priority to the IBC/Cofopri polygons with precisely delimited boundaries. There are 302 of these polygons, constituting 5% of all communities.
3. Identify polygons drawn from BDPI data that overlap partially with other polygons drawn from BDPI. This could again occur because of the convexity of polygons using BDPI data or because of border disagreements. I split the intersecting part equally in these cases and assign it to the nearest polygons. There are 601 of these polygons, constituting 10% of communities.
4. Identify polygons drawn from BDPI data that are entirely contained within IBC/Cofopri polygons. These occur when there are single communities that split but are not reflected in the IBC/Cofopri data. They are quite rare, making up only 11 polygons, or 0.2% of communities.

The map below displays all of the identified community polygons in Peru based on the data source used the calculate them.

Community Polygons Based on Data Source

III. Communities and Populations Represented in ENAHO Sample

ENAHO is a highly regarded household survey conducted by the National Statistics Institute (INEI) that is widely used for policymaking and in academic scholarship on issues like poverty and education. ENAHO is conducted using stratified random sampling based on population areas and is independent in each of Peru's 24 departments. The sampling frame used for selection is based on complete census information along with current cartographic information. In urban areas, the primary sampling units are towns with more than 2,000 inhabitants; the secondary units are local groupings that have on average 120 houses; the tertiary units are individual households. In rural areas, there are two primary sampling units: towns with 500-2,000 individuals and blocks of rural areas that have on average 100 houses. The secondary units are accordingly twofold: in the first set, local groupings that have on average 120 houses; in the second set, individual households. The tertiary units for the first group are in turn individual households. Further details are available in ENAHO documentation. See, for instance, ENAHO, 2016, "Ficha Técnica: Encuesta Nacional de Hogares," Lima, Peru: INEI.

The ENAHO sample used in the paper contains 182,111 respondents from identified communities and covers 1,763 recognized communities for which polygons can be constructed. Of this sample, 79 individuals are dropped because recognition year for their community could not be verified. Another 454 individuals age 65 or older at the time of recognition are dropped since this category is less relevant theoretically and there are too few of them in the sample to include them in the estimations.

The following map indicates which communities are in the ENAHO sample. There is broad spatial coverage of communities in the ENAHO sample.

Communities in ENAHO Sample

The figure below indicates how the ENAHO sample of communities compares to the overall sample in terms of the number of communities and population of those communities by year of recognition. Subfigure (A) indicates the number of communities in the ENAHO sample by year of recognition compared to recognition across all communities. ENAHO covers communities recognized across the whole temporal spectrum of recognition, and in relatively similar proportion by year, though the share of communities recognized in the sample is lower starting around the 1990s with the increase in communities at that period. Subfigure (B) indicates overall community populations circa 2007 in the ENAHO sample of communities by year of recognition. These populations are calculated using individual-level population census data from 2007, including the community these individuals reside in. (Data on contemporaneous community population are unavailable in any official records and cannot be reconstructed from census data.) It then tracks the year of recognition for these individuals' communities. This figure indicates that communities recognized earlier in the process, especially in the 1940s and 1950s, tended to be more populous than communities recognized more recently. Communities recognized in the late 1980s and 1990s tended to be relatively smaller communities by population. Overall, subfigure (B) indicates that communities represented in the ENAHO sample cover a large portion of the population living in communities across year of recognition.

Communities and Populations (Circa 2007) Represented in ENAHO Sample by Year of Recognition

(A) (B)



The table below presents these data in a different way. It shows the number of sampled individuals who reside within communities according to the time period in which their community was recognized. More recently recognized communities do not contribute as much to the estimates because there are few individuals born after or just before recognition who are of age to be surveyed by 2007 in communities recognized after 1990.

Date of recognition	Freq.	Districts	Communities
Period 1921-1940	45,757	260	292
Period 1941-1950	40,523	233	243
Period 1951-1960	13,052	97	96
Period 1961-1970	23,839	183	249
Period 1971-1980	14,419	147	200
Period 1981-1990	27,343	232	379
Period 1991-2000	13,900	145	213
Period 2001-2010	2,236	29	38
Period 2011-2016	509	11	11
Total	**181,578**	**859**	**1721**

IV. Distribution of Sampled Individuals by Community

The following table indicates the sample size of individuals by community that are captured in ENAHO surveys used in the paper.

Sample size of individuals by community	Number of communities
Less than 25	457
25 to 50	255
51 to 100	419
101 to 150	296
151 to 200	111
201 to 500	131
More than 500	43

The following histogram is a density plot of the sample size of individuals by community.



V. ENAHO Survey Questions for Main Outcomes in Analysis

Self-identification with community: “With which group (community) do you feel most identified with? (1) Your department, province, district, or town; (2) Your ethnicity or race; (3) Your peasant or indigenous community; (4) Your religious group or position; (5) Other.”

Community member: “Are you or is one of the household members inscribed in a peasant community?”

Feels democracy works well: “In the country, democracy functions: (4) very well; (3) well; (2) poorly; (1) very poorly; (5) don’t know.”

Trust in regional government: “Do you have confidence in regional government? (4) a lot; (3) some; (2) little; (1) none; (5) don’t know.”

VI. Outcomes by Age at Time of Recognition Versus Year of Birth

The following figure compares the main outcomes of interest by age at the time of community recognition versus year of birth. In particular, self-identification as part of an indigenous community, community membership, and views that democracy works well clearly indicate cohort-based trends with respect to the time of community recognition. That is indicated by the notable positive slopes for these variables in the lefthand side figures. That the lefthand side figures clearly differ in shape and take larger values for certain age cohorts than the righthand side figures, which merely show time trends in these variables by a respondents' year of birth, is strongly suggestive of the age cohort-level effects of recognition. These trends are also present for trust in regional government in part (D), albeit to a lesser degree.

A. Self-Identify as Member of an Indigenous Community



B. Community Member



C. Feels Democracy Works Well





D. Trust in Regional Government